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NDU Opens
World Wide Web
The National Defense University
(NDO 1s pleased to announce the
opening of its World Wde Web
(WWW) WWX’.Through NDU’S web
server, individuals and organizations
with WWW access can obtain much
of the original unclassified NDU
research and a wealth of information
about its constituent organizations: the
bed
Forces StaiTCollege, Information Resources Management College,
Institute for National Strategic Studies
(INSS), Industrial College of the
Armed Forces, National War College
and the workklass NDU library,
Other information includes:
� INSS articles and publications
on current issues of global security
intenst such as Strategic Forum,
h4cNairPapers and Strategic Assessment, which are accessible by title or
WOrd search.
. Promotional
and registration
information on upcoming symposia.
� The NDU Pms catalogue of
books available for order.
Ultimately, the NDU goal is to
include faculty and student papers
cleared for publication. To maximize
the server’s utility, comments and
questions are solicited in the NDU
homepage.
The NDU WWW server can be
reached using most web browsers at
httpfhww.ndu.edu.
For more information, call COL John Burkhart at
(2@ 287-9210, ext. 546, or DSN
667-9210, ext. 546.

Information
Warfare
Conference
The Education Foundation of the
Data I%cessing Management and
Twhnical Marketing Society of
America’s Information WarJan?Conference was held 5 and 6 June 1995
in Los Angeles, California. The conference focused on the technical,
operational and strategic significance
of information warfare. While the
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US Army is a recognized leader in
battlefield digitization, the conference
theme dealt primarily with our society’s information infrastructure, the
emerging cyberspace battlefield and
the impact information technologies will have on 21 st+entury war
concepts.
The conference was attended by a
select group of 45 governmen~ industry and military representatives. Conference participants included Robert
L. Ayers, director, Information Warfare Division, Defense Information
Systems Agency; Captain R. J. CaMarell~ US Navy, director, Information
Warfare/Command and Control Warfare, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations; retired Army Major General Cloyd H. Pfister, consultan~
Twhnology Strategies and Alliances
and Chair of the Army Panel on
Information Systems; retired Rear
Admiral Wesley E. Jo&m, vice president, Advanced Systems, Bolt Beranek and Newman, Inc.; Dr. Michael L.
Brown, senior analys~ Strategic
Assessment Center, Science Applications International Corporation; Dr.
James Llinas, executive engineer, Calspan Copxation; and Edward Waltz,
manager, Corporate program Development
Environmental
Research
Institute-Michigan.
A distinguished panel of experts
discussed defensive information warfare, the Navy’s response to information warfare, information operations,
impact of information technology on
warfare, image and spatial data fusion,
unmanned aerial vehicle technology
and advanced information processing.
Key points raised by conference
participants were:
� Cybempace repxtisents a virtual
fifth dimension characterized by no
geographic, national or temporal
boundaries and no ownership, laws or
identity cards.
. Individuals can conduct information warfare attacks on the economic, political and military inliastructure of the United States. The
Department of Defense (DOD) information network suffered 250,000
attacks last year. Attacks are doubling

each year as intruder technical knowledge becomes more accute.
� Major attacks on US commercial service providem have been
detected. Internet network switches
were attacked by inserting codes that
looked for privileged transactions and
then collected the first 124 characters,
such as destination, user identiikation
and piiSSWO17i DOD research and
development transactions were then
collected and used as the basis of
attacks on DOD computer systems. It
is unknown who is behind these
sophisticated attacks.
� Data modification
k far more
destructive than data destruction.
Data modification is not easily detected. However, data destruction is
readily apparent and can be protected
through proper data backup and security procedures.
. To support two major regional
conflicts in 1995, it is estimated that at
least 65 percent of milit.q information would be carried over vulnerable
commercial lines.
� The information infrastructure
our nation is building represents new
centers of gravity and target sets for
our adversaries. To counter this vulnerrdility, a cyberspace service must
be reseamhed and developed.
. Current paradigms and operational concepts of strategic attack
are based on Colonel John Warden’s
“ring theory” and strategic information warfare.
� In information warfare, your
“observe+rient-decide–act”
loop
must be faster than your opponents.
To achieve this, your loop must be
protected while you disrupt your
opponents.
� Information warfare courses are
now appearing in major military universities across the nation.
� Data fusion has immense potential application on the future battlefield and is based on the concept of
taking points or information concerning three-dimensional
space and
“fiing the data” to image a target.
Adaptive data-fusion systems have
many potential battlefield applications and may provide the heuristic
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basis for Mure “machine” soldiers.
� Defensive
information itiastructure principles =: protect infiastructures and data from information
warfare attack; a%tectattacks upon the
information Mkastrucm,
and nmct

to attacks to maintain information
services.
For Army and governmental leadem alike, this conference provided a
“cutting edge” perspective on the
emerging 2 lst+entwy
cyberspace

battlefield. This new battlefield holds
operational and strategic implications
we are only now beginning to understand.
Robert J. Bunker,CM#iorniaSta@
Univem@, San Berrudino, CM$ornti

Strategic Mobility’s Stem
Colonel Kenneth L. Privratsky, US Army
Powmunm

Getting to Desert
11-importation and
Strategy in the New World Order by

Storm+hdegic

DouglasMenarchik.197pages. PraegerPubIiskm, Westpofi~. 1993.$49.95.

Victory is the beaul~
bright
colored jlowe~ Transport k the
stem withcud which it could never
have bbssomed.
—WinstonChurchill
This statement, written by a young
Winston Churchill before last century’s end, holds particular relevance
today as we approach the beginning of
another century. It reminds us that
before we can win, we must get our
forces and supplies where they are
needed. That may seem simple, but
those familiar with our recent power–
projection experiences in Southwest
Asi% Africa and the Caribbean understand that it is not.
Getting what we need militarily
where and when we need it has never
been easy. It has also never been so
important.
Our ability to project
power over long distances on short
notice-what we call strategic mobil ity--constitutes the core of our current global military strategy. That is
why Churchill’s metaphor
and,
indd, Douglas Menadik’s Powerlljl take on such importance.
Menarchik contends that strategic
transportation, often termed strategic
lift, was the “long pole” in the US
security tent when Iraq invaded
Kuwait five years ago. At the time,
this hardly surprised many in the milithose who had been
@, @cul@
around logistics for awhile. For years
before the invasion, military planners
had waved magic wands over map
boards when it came time to deploy
forces during exercises. Senior lead-
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ers surely knew of strategic lift shortfalls.
The Reagan administration
pumped billions of dollars into the
1980s defense budgets, but little
trickled into air or sealift procurement
programs. The US ability to deploy its
military steadily declined during those
same years.
Then, in August 1990, Iraq invaded
Kuwait and a lot changed. Fortunately, Saddam Hussein foolishly sat
on his newly gained prize for six
months, giving transporters time to get
units and supplies into theater. This
struggle is the basis for Menandik’s
Powerl@, a book that documents the
requirements and problems of projecting Gulf War forces. This book may
not be remembered as a landmark history of Gulf War logistics, and given
its handsome price, it may not find its
way onto many sokiiem’ bookshelves.
Nevertheless, Powerlljl tells a very
important part of the Gulf War story.
Menarchik contends that there
were three strategic moves during @
eration Deseti Shield the first
moved
deterrent and defense forces to the
gulf immediately after the invasion;
the second doubled the force structure,
providing General Norman Schwarzkopf the ability to take the offensive;
and the third postured forces in–
theater, setting the stage for enveloping Iraqi forces. Some will question
why the third “strategic” move is included in Menarchi.k’s analysis, and
justifiably so, since preparation for the
“Hail Mary” envelopment involved
operational, not strategic, movements.
Drawing primarily from ofllcial
briefings and his own interviews with
senior officials, MenarchA presents a
remarkable amay of information on
what was moved and how. Powerllj?
has five chapters, but the first three are
clearly the best. They outline the

international situation at the time of
invasion and provide detailed explanation and analysis of deployments
into the theater. Readers will come
away from these chapt.m impressed
by the heroic stories of the behind–
the-scenes transport
who made
victory possible.
Menarchik describes, for example,
how the US Transportation Command
(USTMNSCOM)
scrambled
to
mobilize lifl assets. USTRANSCOM
was formed just a few years before the
invasion to centralize command and
control (C*) of the service commands
that coordinate and provide strategic
lift: Military Sealift Command, Air
Mobility Command and Military
Traffic Management Command. TO
day, it is had to imagine what would
have happened without this senior
joint headquarters orchestrating the
complex strategic transportation planning and execution.
Powerl@ clearly portrays the commercial carriers’ importance to war
efforts. It revals the vast differences
between prewar plans and actual
requirements for aircraft and ships;
contract efforts for additional assets to
meet those requirements; and various
problems encountered in getting
people and supplies where they were
needed in-theater. A significant portion of the book is Menarchik’s discussion of the fimnel effect that
resulted because of MOG [maximum
aircraft on ground] constraints confimting airlifks.
Scores of charts
and graphs support such discussions.
Transported moved a staggering
volume-300,000
tons of equipment
the first month and 250,000 military
personnel and 1,000 aircraft in the first
three months. However, this tremendous achievement was blunted by
the sobering fact that it took over
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